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Love's Constancy 
MIKE W. MARTIN 
'Marital faithfulness' refers to faithful love for a spouse or lover to 
whom one is committed, rather than the narrower idea of sexual 
fidelity. The distinction is clearly marked in traditional wedding vows. 
A commitment to love faithfully is central: 'to have and to hold from 
this day forward, for better for worse, for richer for poorer, in sickness 
and in health, to love and to cherish, till death us do part . . . and 
thereto I plight [pledge] thee my troth [faithfulness]'. Sexual fidelity is 
promised in a subordinate clause, symbolizing its supportive role in 
promoting love's constancy: 'and, forsaking all other, keep thee only 
unto her/him.'2 
Marital commitments to love have been subjected to a barrage of 
objections. They have been criticized as unintelligible, unreasonable, 
inhumane, unnecessary, non-binding, and incompatible with love. I 
respond to these objections in Part I, seeking to uncover the partial 
truths as well as the confusions they embody. Then, in Part II, I 
explore why marital faithfulness is a virtue, that is, a morally desirable 
feature of spouses who make lifelong commitments, rather than simply 
a matter of individual preferences. Throughout, I develop a conception 
1 Church of England Prayer Book (1549). I will understand marriage as a 
moral relationship centred on lifelong commitments to love and significantly 
involving sexual desire at some time during the relationship, whether or not 
the marriage is formalized in legal or religious ceremonies, recognizing homo- 
sexual as well as heterosexual marriages, and independently of government 
intrusions. On the latter see David Palmer, 'The Consolation of the Wedded', 
in Philosophy and Sex, 2nd edn, Robert Baker and Frederick Elliston (eds) 
(Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1984), 119-129. 
2 Or its presumed supportive role. Some couples, of course, enter into (or 
transform their relationship into) 'open marriages' in which they permit 
extramarital ffairs while retaining lifetime commitments. For an early and 
especially interesting example, see Nigel Nicolson's portrayal of his parents in 
Portrait of a Marriage (New York: Atheneum, 1973). Two illuminating (and 
contrasting) discussions of the rationale for traditional links between lifetime 
marital commitments and sexual fidelity are: Edmund Leites, The Puritan 
Conscience and Modern Sexuality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1986), and Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire (New York: Free Press, 1986). 
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of 'true' (erotic) love as value-guided attitudes and relationships that 
constitute special ways to value persons.3 
I. Commitments to Love 
Consider the following conversation from Tolstoy's Kreutzer Sonata. 
'Yes, but how is one to understand what is meant by "true love"?' said 
the gentleman .... 
'Why? It's very simple,' she said, but stopped to consider. 'Love? 
Love is an exclusive preference for one above everybody else,' said 
the lady. 
'Preference for how long? A month, two days, or half an hour?' 
said the grey-haired man and began to laugh. 
'Excuse me, we are evidently not speaking of the same thing'.... 
'Yes, I know . .. you are talking about what is supposed to be, but 
I am speaking of what is. Every man experiences what you call love 
for every pretty woman.' 
'Oh, what you say is awful! But the feeling that is called love does 
exist among people, and is given not for months or years, but for a 
lifetime!' 
'No, it does not!. . .'4 
The cynical gentleman, who we learn later has murdered his wife, 
thinks of erotic love as a feeling based on sexual desire, a feeling which 
comes and goes with sexual interest. The lady initially portrays love as a 
paramount preference, hinting that love is a way of valuing persons 
(which involves but is not reducible to feelings). In her subsequent 
remarks, however, she agrees with the gentleman that love is a feeling, 
and the disagreement then shifts to how long the feeling can last. This 
brings us to the first objection to marital commitments. 
Objection 1: Love and Will. Commitments to love are unintelligible, 
given the nature of love. A commitment implies a resolve or pledge to 
engage in actions which are under our voluntary control. But love is an 
emotion, not an action. As such it happens to us; we do not choose it. 
3 Irving Singer develops the idea of love as a special way of valuing persons in 
his masterful three-volume study, The Nature of Love (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984, 1987). Whereas I understand ('true') love as permeated 
by the virtues, Singer separates morality and love, as a result of his constricted 
view of morality as demanding impartiality (by contrast with love's preference 
for one individual). See especially p. 11 of vol. I. 
4 Leo Tolstoy, Great Short Works of Leo Tolstoy, trans. Louise and Aylmer 
Maude (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 361-362. Also see Paul Gilbert's 
discussion in Human Relationships (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 9ff. 
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The idea of committing ourselves to love is as incoherent as committing 
ourselves to feel grief. 
This objection assumes that commitments to love refer to love as a 
feeling or emotion. I suggest instead that the love referred to is pri- 
marily an attitude and a relationship. A commitment o love is a 
commitment to sustain an attitude of valuing the beloved as singularly 
important in one's life. Thus, spouses who say to each other'I love you' 
are typically expressing a complex and durable attitude that is revealed 
in patterns of conduct, rather than a momentary feeling. In addition, a 
commitment to love implies taking on responsibility for a relationship. 
It is a commitment to activities that sustain the relationship-activities 
of caring and support, of sharing resources, of living together 
harmoniously. 
In general, talk about 'true love' alludes to desirable attitudes and 
value-guided relationships. Ideals enter into their very meaning. One 
traditional ideal is to value another person above others based on a 
lifelong commitment. This ideal is hardly reducible to sexual desire and 
feelings, although it involves exual attraction as an important aspect of 
valuing the beloved (at least throughout much of the relationship). The 
ideal, as well as the attitude and relationship grounded in it, are in part 
constituted by the virtues of caring, fidelity, honesty, fairness-and 
faithfulness. These 'constitutive virtues' contrast with 'coping virtues', 
such as courage, prudence, and perseverance which enable love to 
flourish. 
Of course, emotions are centrally involved in loving attitudes and 
relationships. They include strong affection, but also delight, joy, 
concern, hope, gratitude, jealousy, anger, pride, guilt, shame, and 
grief. Hence the objection can be rephrased: Commitments to love 
imply commitments to have emotions; those commitments are unin- 
telligible because we cannot choose to feel emotions; therefore, com- 
mitments to love are unintelligible. 
In reply, note first hat the issue is not whether love can be created 
from scratch by a spasm of will. A strong predisposition to love's 
emotions is already present when the commitment o love is made, 
especially if we are dealing with freely chosen, rather than arranged 
marriages. In the early stages of love we are largely passive, as ordinary 
language testifies: we fall in love, get struck by lightning, are swept 
away by passion. We cannot voluntarily generate the deeply-felt rush of 
emotions that signal love (although we can willingly open or close 
ourselves to such experiences). Commitments o love, however, are not 
aimed at creating emotions from scratch; they are aimed at sustaining 
an already-present disposition to have them, and to enable feelings of 
mutual caring and delight to grow deeper. 
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These commitments make sense because emotions are somewhat 
under our control. To be sure, the idea of committing ourselves to feel 
exactly this or that emotion at a particular time is problematic, at least 
for complex emotions. We can promise to try to enjoy a party, where 
that means setting aside worries for a while, but complex genuine 
emotions are heartfelt, not mentally manufactured. Nevertheless, com- 
mitments to love are consistent with these facts. They do not imply 
manipulating emotions, nor turning emotions on and off like a faucet. 
Instead, they imply assuming responsibility for sustaining patterns of 
acts and thoughts that foster emotions conducive to love.5 
Conduct influences emotions. A commitment o love implies a 
strong willingness to choose activities that promote love-enhancing 
emotions and to avoid love-threatening emotions. Couples can avoid 
situations which they know cause anger, jealousy, or anxiety. They can 
choose activities which bring mutual pleasure and evoke mutual affec- 
tion and intimacy. They can set aside time together and prevent work 
from encroaching on their privacy. And they can learn coping skills, 
such as the ability and willingness to compromise, to communicate 
clearly, and to fight fair (in ways that minimize long-term tension and 
hostility). 
In addition, reflection influences emotions. At the core of most 
emotions are beliefs, attitudes, and patterns of attention which may be 
more or less reasonable.6 Assessing reasons can alter this core and 
thereby shape emotions. For example, couples can choose to dwell on 
the bright side of situations o as to encourage positive emotions, or 
allow themselves to dwell on the negative so as to evoke fear, anxiety, 
and doubt.7 They can bring to mind a shared history of good times, and 
look forward to positive change in order to encourage hope, or wallow 
in frustrations so as to nurse despair. They can think through mitigat- 
ing circumstances in order to become more forgiving of their spouses 
and themselves. In short, conduct and reflection can promote an 
already-present disposition to love's emotions within value-guided 
relationships. 
Objection 2: Ought Implies Can. Lifetime commitments to love are 
not morally binding, given the nature of morality. Commitments imply 
5 John Wilson, 'Can One Promise to Love Another?' Philosophy 64 (1989), 
560. Also see Edward Sankowski, 'Responsibility of Persons for Their Emo- 
tions,' Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1977), 829-840. 
6 Amelie Oksenberg Rorty argues that the core of some emotions is a pattern 
of attention rather than the more common beliefs and attitudes in 'Explaining 
Emotions', in Explaining Emotions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1980), 103-126. 
7 Cf. Martin E. P. Seligman, Learned Optimism (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1991). 
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obligations and hence 'oughts'. As Kant said, 'ought implies can': We 
are obligated to do only what we can do, or at least what we can 
reasonably be expected to do. Now, many individuals cannot sustain 
lifetime commitments since they involve far too many unforeseeable 
things beyond their control (not just emotions). In J. F. M. Hunter's 
words, 'a promise is binding only to the extent that its performance is 
reasonably within the power of the person promising. If I promise to 
return your book by Thursday . .. you have some right to complain of 
bad faith if I fail; but if I promise to enjoy a certain film, to become a 
millionaire, or to be your friend for twenty ears, then no matter how 
serious you take me to be, you would not have a clear right to complain 
if I failed to deliver. Now, a marriage vow can be seen as a promise of 
the latter kind'.8 
To begin with, we should be careful in interpreting the slogan 'ought 
implies can'. While the word 'ought' is most often used to prescribe 
conduct, and while there is no point in prescribing that people do the 
impossible, 'ought' has other uses as well.9 It is used to ascribe obliga- 
tions which persons may have even after rendering themselves unable 
to meet them. Thus, all drivers ought to drive safely-that is their 
obligation, an obligation which does not disappear when they become 
too drunk to meet it. At the time they are drunk it may be pointless to 
tell them they ought not to be driving, but it is true none the less, and 
later (retrospectively) there may be a point in reminding them of their 
past failures to do what they ought to have done. 
Most obligations do imply the general capacity to meet them. Moral- 
ity is realistic in this sense: We are obligated to avoid stealing, to show 
gratitude, and to help others only in so far as we have the general 
capacity to do so without unreasonable sacrifice. These examples con- 
cern duties we all have, independently of our commitments, whereas 
the objection concerns commitments to do what turns out not to be 
possible. Do such commitments ever create obligations? 
Consider those overly-ambitious and naive business persons who 
enter into contracts which they cannot meet, given their talents, other 
resources, and the limitations imposed by the world. Their commit- 
ments are unrealistic, but nevertheless they generate legal and moral 
obligations. Declaring bankruptcy may cancel the legal obligation, but 
an apology or more substantive expression of guilt and compensation 
(for wrongs done) may be appropriate where great harm is done to 
8 J. F. M. Hunter, Thinking about Sex and Love (Toronto: Macmillan of 
Canada, 1980), 59. 
9 Except when it inspires individuals to do more than they could have 
otherwise. On this, and on the entire topic of 'ought implies can', see Nicholas 
Rescher, Ethical Idealism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). 
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others. What about those lovers who commit hemselves to what turns 
out to be impossible, a lifetime together? Well, is that what they 
promise? Normally they promise to do everything in their power to 
make a marriage work, not to do what turns out to be impossible. 
Hence, we need to look in each case into why the relationship did not 
work out. If the cause is general irresponsibility or lack of effort, hen it 
may not have been impossible at all. If instead the cause was that one's 
partner abandoned one for no good reason, or that poverty and tragedy 
drove the couple apart, we readily excuse or forgive. 
Lifetime promises may prove impossible to keep because of 
unforeseeable difficulties that were beyond the ability of a couple to 
handle, or beyond what is reasonable to expect them to do. It is often 
difficult to tell when that is, as I will emphasize later. But until those 
difficulties become clear, couples can intelligibly make morally-bind- 
ing lifetime commitments. 
I should add that marital faithfulness involves a commitment to a 
person-to love, honour and cherish one's spouse. It is faithfulness toa 
promise in a secondary, symbolic way. Why should the wedding prom- 
ise be kept? The secondary answer is that the promise was made; the 
primary answer is to preserve, further or restore the love that led a 
couple to make the promise in the first place. In this way, faithfulness is 
primarily aimed at the substance of the wedding vow-the loving 
relationship itself-rather than at the one-time marital promise.10 The 
longer the love continues, the wider the scope of faithfulness: Faithful- 
ness is to the love in its full historical development, its actual past, its 
present achievements, and its projected future. 
Objection 3: Changing Identities. Lifelong commitments o love are 
not morally binding. They lack moral import because they are uncondi- 
tional and falsely presume that spouses will retain their present identi- 
ties. Each of us will change dramatically over a lifetime, so much so that 
we can think of a person as a series of selves rather than one unified self. 
How can my present self morally bind a substantially different later self 
to do anything several decades from now? That is like trying to make a 
promise for another person, whereas promises are only binding on the 
person who makes them. Again, how can I (with moral cogency) 
commit myself to a partner who will be remarkably different several 
decades later? That is like making a blanket promise to someone I do 
not know. 
Are marriage vows unconditional? Surely wedding vows are tacitly 
conditional, as Hunter argues: in the course of a marriage 'a couple may 
become entirely different persons, with ambitions, tastes, idio- 
10 Cf. P. E. Hutchings, 'Conjugal Faithfulness', Human Values, Godfrey 
Vesey (ed.) (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1978). 
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syncrasies or emotional attachments or aversions that could not initially 
be foreseen, and given which it would be utterly absurd for them to 
marry. That being the case, it seems reasonable to treat such vows at a 
minimum as implicitly containing some such clause as "assuming you 
are substantially the person I believe you to be, and that neither of us 
changes, as the years go by, in ways more extreme than are common to 
human beings as they grow older"'." 
Susan Mendus rejected this view and insisted that marital vows are 
unconditional. She drew a 'distinction between . .. the person who 
promises to love and to honour but who finds that, after a time, she has 
lost her commitment (perhaps on account of change in her husband's 
character), and . .. the person who promises to love and to honour only 
on condition that there be no such change in character'.'2 The latter 
person is not committed unconditionally, in the spirit of traditional 
marriage vows. The former person makes the appropriate commitment 
and revokes it later, something which is perfectly intelligible as a 
morally binding promise which, perhaps for good reason, must be 
broken. There is a genuine obligation, but it is not absolute; there are 
conditions under which it is justifiably broken. She adds that vows are 
unconditional when 'I cannot now envisage anything happening such as 
would make me give up that commitment'.'3 
Mendus's distinction is important, but her account of unconditional 
vows is implausible. Surely most spouses can envisage circumstances 
that would lead them to abandon their commitments o love each other, 
at least if 'envisage' means imagine. For one thing, they can imagine 
their spouse being transformed into a spouse-beating, child-abusing 
monster. " In making their lifelong commitments, they presuppose that 
will not occur, and in that sense their commitments are conditional. 
For another thing, they can imagine their spouse leaving them; 
indeed, they likely fear that at one time or another, whether as a general 
possibility given today's fifty percent divorce rate or for reasons directly 
related to their partner. They would not feel obligated to sustain their 
marriage if their spouse abandoned them, and hence this is a second 
way their marital vows are conditional. At least today, wedding vows 
have 'escape clauses', however vague or extreme. They are implicit in 
the wedding ceremony in which vows are made together, conditional on 
their partner's reciprocal vows. 
1 J. F. M. Hunter, Thinking about Sex and Love, 59. Cf. Derek Parfit, 
'Later Selves and Moral Principles', Philosophy and Personal Relations, A. 
Montefiore (ed.) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973). 
12 Susan Mendus, 'Marital Faithfulness', Philosophy 59 (1984), 246. 13 P. 247. 
14 Alan Soble, The Structure of Love (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1990), 166-167. 
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If there are always conditions, why do marriage vows fail to mention 
them and even seem to rule them out-'for better for worse, for richer 
for poorer, in sickness and in health?' And why do not enlightened 
couples mutter under their breath, 'unless one of us changes radically'? 
The answer is obvious but important. Couples have faith that their 
marriage will endure, that they will keep their commitments, and at the 
very least that neither will turn into a monster. That faith can waver 
periodically, and it is compatible with realism about the risk that things 
will not work out. But marriage is an act of faith-of placing trust in, 
rather than merely hoping or expecting-as the unconditional tone of 
lifetime vows conveys. Faith is essential, not only as an expression of 
love, but because it tends to be self-fulfilling by providing security and 
trust in which relationships prosper. 
Objection 4: Motives for Loving. Lifelong commitments to love are 
(ironically) incompatible with love. Commitments create obligations 
which threaten love by generating an onerous sense of duty to abide by a 
contract. As Robert Solomon once wrote, 'Love is not ... a commit- 
ment. It is the very antithesis of a commitment. The legal tit-for-tat 
quasi-"social contract" thinking of commitment talk fatally confuses 
doing something because one wants to do it and doing something 
because one has to do it, whether or not one wants to at the time'.15 'The 
essence of romantic love is a decision, open-ended but by the same 
token perpetually insecure, open to reconsideration every moment and, 
of course, open to rejection by one's lover at every moment too'.16 
Lifetime commitments do close options-decisively. They do so in 
order to open better options within sustained, stable, trusting relation- 
ships. There are, of course, alternative ideals of love which keep all 
options open. Those romantics and existentialists, not to mention 
libertines and Don Juans, who treasure the right to change one's mind 
at any moment (without culpability) do well to reject lifelong commit- 
ments. These alternate ideals, not commitments and responsibilities, 
are incompatible with traditional marital love. 
Solomon is right about this much: relationships are in trouble once 
they degenerate into a quasi-legal, tit-for-tat struggle, with each partner 
preoccupied in asserting the rights generated by promises. But moral 
commitments are not reducible to contracts in the way he implies. 
Commitments generate responsibilities which support rather than 
threaten love's constancy. They do so largely by remaining in the 
background, perhaps surfacing in times of conflict and temptation, as 
15 Robert Solomon, Love: Emotion, Myth and Metaphor (Garden City, NY: 
Anchor Press, 1981), 224. 
16 P. 227. 
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reminders that help stabilize relationships. They are reinforcements, 
not replacements, of caring. 
It is important to distinguish between having a commitment to love 
and the motives for keeping the commitment.'7 The motives are pri- 
marily such things as love, caring, joy, a sense of identity and solidarity 
with, as well as self-interest, and only secondarily (and supportively) a 
sense of responsibility. The same is true of parents, for example, who 
have responsibilities to care for their children, but who are primarily 
motivated by love mixed with elements of self-interest. 
Objection 5: The Power of Love. Lifelong commitments are 
unnecessary, given the power of love to conquer obstacles. Commit- 
ments and the obligations they imply are inessential, according to 
Solomon: 'The devotion and particularity of love are such that commit- 
ment is quite unnecessary, although it may well present itself as an 
expression of love'.18 Lasting devotion does not require commitments, 
which generate obligations, but only a 'decision to stick with it and see it 
through'. 9 
So it seems-in the early stage of romance, when love seems to make 
everything possible, certainly its own continuance. But honeymoons 
end, and the world intrudes with problems about money, jobs, health, 
social conflicts, disagreements about furniture, and a thousand other 
things. Active love, understood as an ideal-guided relationship, typi- 
cally requires commitments if it is to remain constant (and growing) 
throughout a lifetime. 
Not just the world, but lovers themselves change, as an earlier 
objection emphasized. They grow and regress, and undergo a variety of 
experiences that can mute romance. Commitment generates a sense of 
responsibility which provides stable trust through fluctuations in tem- 
perament. Mary Midgley said in a related context, 'Campaigners 
against [marriage] . . . have been remarkably crass in posing the simple 
dilemma, "either you want to stay together or you don't-if you do, you 
need not promise; if you don't, you ought to part". This ignores the 
chances of inner conflict, and the deep human need for a continuous 
central ife that lasts through genuine, but passing, changes of mood'.20 
Commitment isnot sufficient to maintain love, but it adds an additional 
motive for not succumbing to, much less seeking out, temptations that 
threaten love. 
17 Cf. Lawrence A. Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980). 
18 Robert Solomon,About Love (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 40. 
19 P. 134. 
20 Mary Midgley, Beast and Man (New York: New American Library, 
1980), 303. 
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Objection 6: Creative Divorce. Lifetime commitments are in- 
humane. They are essentially commitments never to divorce, and that 
amounts to cruelty and torture when one or both partners find a 
marriage unbearable. Divorce can be creative, as well as a painful 
necessity. Lifetime commitments are immoral because they preclude 
divorce. 
This objection applies within societies that forbid divorce, but not to 
contemporary societies governed by laws that make divorce a relatively 
simple legal matter. Suppose that in good faith, with trust and faith that 
divorce will not occur, partners make lifetime commitments, and then 
do everything they can to make things work out. They do not succeed, 
and the marriage disintegrates to the point where it is no longer worth- 
while. After every effort is made to repair damage, one or both partners 
may be fully justified in abandoning their commitment. 
Objection 7: Prudence. Lifetime commitments are unreasonable, 
irrational, imprudent. They fail to show proper regard for one's long- 
term good. A prudent person forms a plan of life that takes into account 
how changing circumstances or new knowledge can radically alter one's 
present conception of good, as well as the means to it. Right now love 
brings happiness, but who knows what it will bring decades later? 
Lifetime commitments sacrifice far too many options, and hence it is 
prudent to make only short-term commitments. 
Of course, lifetime commitments are unreasonable for some individ- 
uals. What is in one's interests and what serves the mutual good of 
couples varies too widely to generalize about. The same reason, how- 
ever, should lead us to reject a universal objection to lifetime commit- 
ments. That objection omits the good-promoting features of lifetime 
commitments, in particular the framework they provide for ongoing 
mutual caring, support, joy, and fulfilment. Marriage closes some 
options but opens others which may be far preferable, depending on 
our ideals of love. 
Lifetime commitments to love are not prisons; they are vehicles for 
helping partners deal together with changing situations, interests, and 
needs. Partners do commit themselves to put the relationship first, to 
accommodate other things to it, including careers. Other than that, 
however, relationships are as accommodating and flexible as partners 
choose to make them. 
II. Faithfulness as a Virtue 
Is marital faithfulness a virtue, that is, something morally desirable and 
admirable? Presumably virtues are intrinsically good. Marital con- 
stancy, however, is desirable in some cases but undesirable in others, 
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depending on how well a marriage promotes the good of spouses and 
others (especially children). Faithfulness eems more a matter of self- 
interest, luck, and simple compatibility, rather than morality. Perhaps 
commitments to love should be understood in terms of intentions but 
not obligations. That would also free us to approach divorce without 
being preoccupied with betrayal and blame-mongering. In short, 
should not the entire topic of marriage be de-moralized? 
No-if we value the goods made possible in long-term marriages. 
Here I will make six comments by way of clarifying faithfulness a a 
virtue. 
First, we can acknowledge that when a marriage is disastrous and 
hopeless, constancy can be bad rather than virtuous in that it prolongs a 
bad thing. But it does not follow that faithfulness is not a virtue. Virtues 
are context-dependent. Michael Slote pointed out that 'many virtues 
only count as such when they are attended by certain other virtues'.21 
For example, conscientiousness i a virtue, or at least a highly admir- 
able virtue, only when it involves attention to duties that promote 
human good, as opposed for example to the conscientiousness of a 
Nazi. Similarly, Eva Braun's faithfulness in loving Hitler is not a 
virtue, nor is constancy in love for a wife-beating, child-abusing, 
sadistic husband. In general, faithfulness i desirable and admirable 
only in so far as there is something good about the love. That good 
centres on caring-mutual caring, support, kindness, and joy-which 
is morally desirable in itself and which contributes to the fulfilment of 
persons. 
Second, taking moral commitments seriously does carry with it the 
possibility of betrayal-of one's spouse, of oneself, and of one's ideals of 
love. At the same time, not meeting an ideal does not automatically 
imply moral failure and blameworthiness, given causes beyond our 
control. Marital betrayal is usually the result of not trying, or not trying 
hard enough. But all the effort in the world cannot by itself achieve 
marital success-without luck. 
Some loves are lucky; others are unfortunate, ven tragic, due to 
circumstances that spouses can only partially influence.22 Luck, as well 
as good judgment, plays a role in finding a promising partner whom one 
finds attractive physically, intellectually, morally, socially, and in 
terms of shared interests and values. Then, if a permanent relationship 
is to emerge, partners must be able to trust each other's commitments. 
During their shared history, the basis of love must remain sufficiently 
constant o overcome inevitable difficulties, such as money problems, 
21 Michael Slote, Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 62ff. 
22 Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge University 
Press, 1986), 359-361. 
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major illness, temporary separations, and changing interests. Later, 
the relationship must survive the ravages of old age, and at any time the 
threat of death to one of the partners. In addition, there is luck in 
having the gifts of temperament conducive to monogamy, gifts that are 
in part genetic and in part the product of our upbringing.23 All these 
factors call for great reserve in judging people who are unable to meet 
their marital commitments. 
Third, it is true that talk about faithfulness and betrayal should be set 
aside in some contexts. The therapist's office is one such context. In 
order to help couples or individuals deal with marital or divorce diffi- 
culties, counsellors do well to keep matters focused on problem-solving 
skills, not blame-mongering and credit-grabbing. So do couples them- 
selves, as they try to improve their relationship (rather than engage in 
exercises in self-righteousness). And observers who know little about 
the obstacles confronting a marriage should be wary of passing judg- 
ment. This does not, however, negate the appropriateness of moral 
language in other contexts, such as marriage ceremonies which publicly 
express solemn acts of acquiring responsibilities. 
Fourth, acknowledging the role of luck does not remove the vital 
contribution of effort, responsibility, and moral virtue in shaping good 
relationships. Unless we are fatalists, who view human life as deter- 
mined in ways that remove moral responsibility, we must recognize 
that faithfulness plays an important role. Precisely what role, in a given 
case, can be difficult o answer. 
Thus, in examining individual cases, whether ourselves or others, we 
confront ambiguities that make it difficult to tell whether inconstancy is 
the result of temperament, luck, or irresponsibility of the sort that leads 
us to talk of betrayal and unfaithfulness. Consider Bertrand Russell, 
who reports that seven years into his marriage he suddenly fell out of 
love with his wife. 'I went out bicycling one afternoon, and suddenly, as 
I was riding along a country road, I realized that I no longer loved Alys. 
I had had no idea until this moment that my love for her was even 
lessening'.24 
What does Russell mean by 'love'? He goes on to record that he was 
no longer sexually attracted to Alys and that also he had become 
preoccupied with her character faults. In his autobiography, however, 
he admits the unfairness and self-righteousness in his criticisms of Alys, 
and in a passage omitted from the final draft of the book he explained 
the breakup by appeal to his temperament: 'I now believe that it is not 
23 Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1981), 26ff. 
24 Bertrand Russell, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, Vol. 1 (New 
York: Bantam Books, 1968), 195-196. 
74 
This content downloaded from 206.211.139.182 on Mon, 10 Nov 2014 15:17:51 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Love's Constancy 
in my nature to remain physically fond of any woman for more than 
seven or eight years. As I view it now, this was the basis of the matter, 
and the rest was humbug'.25 We need not accept Russell's explanation as 
authoritative, any more than Russell had to accept his own earlier 
interpretation of events. Some might interpret the bicycle experience as 
a symptom of the 'seven-year itch' which other couples deal with 
through marriage counselling or by taking a long vacation together. 
Possibly Russell was not only self-righteous but, like the gentleman in 
The Kreutzer Sonata, guilty of bad faith in reducing his love to sexual 
desire and related feelings.26 He prides himself on his honesty in 
promptly telling Alys that his love was gone, but perhaps full honesty 
would lead to a quite different conversation with Alys in which together 
they explored his troubled feelings with an eye to preserving an ideal- 
guided relationship. 
As another possibility, perhaps Russell had undergone a fundamen- 
tal change in his ideals since making his wedding vows. Perhaps he was 
rebelling against the Victorian ideals he had been raised with. Not 
temperament, but a new ideal of love was the reason he could so quickly 
conclude that his sexual relationship with Alys was over. In any case, 
some individuals do change their ideals, rejecting marital faithfulness 
after having earlier made lifelong commitments in good faith. Anais 
Nin, for example, arrived at this view of faithfulness after entering a 
fairly traditional marriage: 'I really believe that if I were not a writer, 
not a creator, not an experimenter, I might have been a very faithful 
wife. I think highly of faithfulness. But my temperament belongs to the 
writer, not to the woman'.27 A year later, in the midst of her tumultuous 
affair with Henry Miller, her attitude changed again: 'The ideal of 
faithfulness i a joke' and the essential value in love is 'sincerity with 
one's self'.28 
Fifth, appreciating marital faithfulness as a virtue does not mean 
making it the supreme value. Marital obligations are not absolute in the 
sense of always overriding all other considerations. Consider Paul 
Gauguin, who after a decade into his marriage, and after fathering five 
children, quit his job as a successful stockbroker to become a full-time 
artist. For most of the remainder of his life he did not earn enough 
money to support his family. It is difficult to avoid saying that he was 
25 Quoted by Barbara Strachey in Remarkable Relations (London: Victor 
Gollancz, 1980), 216. 
26 Mary Midgley, Wisdom, Information a d Wonder (New York: Routledge, 
1989), p. 157. 
27 Anais Nin, Henry and June (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1986), 29. 
28 P. 229. 
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unfaithful. It is also difficult o avoid admiring what he did-in one 
respect-if we value the art he produced and realize that it could not 
have been produced except at the expense of his family.29 We, perhaps 
like him, may regret that the world did not make possible a happier 
accommodation of art and family, but we may also view aesthetic values 
and the moral value of self-fulfilment as providing some reasons for his 
conduct. 
Sixth, we tend to think of faithfulness interms of staying the same in 
the midst of changing circumstances, especially changes in our spouse. 
Shakespeare gave the classical expression of this idea: 
'love is not love/Which alters when it alteration finds .. ./it is an ever- 
fixed mark/That looks on tempests and is never shaken'.30 
Yet it is more accurate, albeit more prosaic, to say that faithful love 
constantly modifies and adjusts in response to changes. Rigidity can 
contribute to unfaithfulness. 
Dorothy Day recounts how her common-law marriage with Forster 
Batterham ended because he could not adjust to her decision to have 
their child and herself baptized in the Catholic Church. Prior to her 
decision, the marriage had been joyous, and deeply rooted in a shared 
devotion to social justice-a devotion which Day sustained throughout 
her subsequent leadership in the Catholic Worker Movement. Yet 
Batterham was also adamantly anti-religious: 'he was averse to any 
ceremony before officials of either Church or state. He was an anarchist 
and an atheist, and he did not intend to be a liar or a hypocrite. He was a 
creature of utter sincerity, and however illogical and bad-tempered 
about it all, I loved him'.31 In order for Batterham to remain faithful, his 
love would have had to adjust so as to accept, or at least tolerate, Day's 
new religious outlook. 
The best marriages, like the best persons, are often seriously flawed. 
Faithfulness is a virtue when it supports good though imperfect rela- 
tionships. The same is true of tolerance and humility. Nietzsche was no 
booster of marriages, but what he said of strong characters applies to 
strong marriages: "'Giving style" to one's character [and marriage]-a 
great and rare art! It is exercised by those who see all the strengths and 
weaknesses of their own natures [and marriage] and then comprehend 
them in an artistic plan until everything appears as art and reason and 
29 Michael Slote, Goods and Virtues, 77ff. 
30 Sonnet 116. 
31 Dorothy Day, The Long Loneliness (New York: Harper & Row, 1952), 
147-148. 
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even weakness delights the eye. ... Here the ugly which could not be 
removed is hidden; there it has been reinterpreted and made sublime'.32 
Chapman University 
32 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1974), 232. 
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